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HOW SHOULD  WE DETERMINE  WHO
SHOULD  REGULATE  LAWYERS?-
MANAGING  CONFLICT AND  CONTEXT IN
PROFESSIONAL REGULATION
David B. Wilkins*
INTRODUCTION
0  n  many  a late  night during  the  summer  and  fall  of  1991,  as  I
struggled  to  revise  yet  another  draft  of Who  Should Regulate
Lawyers?,'  I  comforted  myself  by  reciting  the  mantra  intoned  by
countless  assistant  professors  working  on  tenure  pieces  before  me:
"Don't worry, you can always fix any problems in the next article, and
besides no one will ever read this anyway!"  Thanks  to Ted Schneyer,
the AALS Professional Responsibility Section, and the Fordham Law
Review, I have now been given the opportunity to "fix"  my prior mis-
takes  by  examining  the  thoughtful  contributions  of  an  outstanding
group of authors  and commentators  who have not only read my arti-
cle, but have taken the comparative institutional analysis  I advocated
there in provocative  and important directions.
Needless  to say, I have no intention  of trying to correct  the many
errors  and omissions in my prior work.  Nor can I address  all  of the
challenging  issues  raised  in  the Symposium.  Instead,  I  want to take
this opportunity to say a few words about two questions that confront
scholars interested in comparative institutional analysis in the field  of
professional  regulation.  The  first  is  methodological:  What  are  the
proper criteria for comparing institutions in  this area?  The second is
substantive:  Does a comparative institutional analysis  suggest a con-
textual approach to professional  regulation, and  if so,  is such  an  ap-
proach feasible?  The next two parts  briefly  examine these questions
in  light of what  I have  learned  from the  other contributions  to  this
Symposium.  I  conclude  by  saying  a  few  words  about  the  future  of
comparative  institutional analysis.
*  Kirkland and Ellis Professor of Law and Director of the Program on the Legal
Profession,  Harvard Law  School.  I am indebted  to Ted Schneyer  for many helpful
conversations  concerning  the issues  raised by this  Symposium.  Erin Edmonds  and
Anwar Frangi provided invaluable research  and editorial  assistance.
1. David  B.  Wilkins,  Who  Should Regulate Lawyers?,  105  Harv.  L  Rev.  799
(1992)  [hereinafter  Wilkins,  Who Should Regulate Lawyers?].FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
I.  COMPARED  TO WHAT?
When  I  wrote  Who  Should Regulate Lawyers?, the  first  question
that  I  had  to  answer  was  not  how  to  do  a  comparative  analysis  of
regulatory institutions, but rather whether such an analysis was neces-
sary at all.  Most  articles in the field devoted surprisingly little  atten-
tion to comparing existing or proposed enforcement  mechanisms with
others that might  be employed.  Those commentators  that  did com-
pare  regulatory  systems,  for example,  in  the  course  of  condemning
Rule 11,  often relied on an idealized account of alternative methods of
controlling lawyer misconduct, generally the disciplinary  system, that
bore little relationship  to reality.
The  dearth  of  rigorous  comparative  analysis  limited  the  value  of
much  that  was  written  about  professional  regulation.  As  Ted
Schneyer nicely summarizes  in his Foreword to this Symposium, virtu-
ally every proposal to either expand, contract, or retain a given institu-
tion's regulatory authority rests on assumptions about the competence
of  alternative  regulatory  structures.2  Without  critical  examination,
these assumptions  have been  allowed  to drive policy choices  in ways
that may not serve the goal of creating  a workable  and effective  sys-
tem for regulating lawyers.  As more and more institutions claim some
degree  of regulatory  authority over  the legal profession,  the  danger
that important decisions about the distribution of regulatory authority
will be made on the basis  of little more than folklore or intuition has
correspondingly  increased.
To  acknowledge  the need for  a comparative  analysis  of regulatory
institutions,  however,  does not  answer  the  question  of how  such  an
analysis should be conducted.  As Fred Zacharias  argues, professional
regulation potentially serves a number of discrete functions, including
deterring misconduct, providing  guidance  to practitioners,  contribut-
ing to public debate, and improving the image  of regulators  or those
whom  they regulate.3  Moreover,  as  Ted Schneyer  notes, regulatory
institutions  can  pursue these  goals through  a  number  of interrelated
tasks,  ranging  from  drafting  rules  of  conduct  to  enforcing  existing
2.  See Ted Schneyer, Foreword: Legal Process  Scholarship  and the Regulation of
Lawyers, 65 Fordham L. Rev. 33, 53-54 (1996)  [hereinafter Schneyer, Foreword]. For
example, in 1991, the ABA reiterated its long-standing  view that the traditional disci-
plinary system should be the exclusive mechanism for enforcing  the rules  of profes-
sional conduct. See A.B.A. Commission on Evaluation of Disciplinary  Enforcement,
Report to the House of Delegates 3-4 (1991).  This claim rests on the assumption that
professional  discipline  is  "more  effective"  in  some  relevant  sense  than  available
alternatives.
3.  Fred C. Zacharias,  Who Can Best Regulate the Ethics of Federal  Prosecutors,
or, Who Should Regulate the Regulators?: Response to Little, 65 Fordham L. Rev. 429,
448  n.82  (1996)  [hereinafter  Zacharias, Response to Little].  Professor Zacharias  de-
velops this important point in Fred  C. Zacharias, Specificity in Professional  Responsi-
bility Codes:  Theory, Practice, and the Paradigm of Prosecutorial  Ethics, 69  Notre
Dame  L. Rev.  223,  225-39  (1993)  [hereinafter Zacharias, Specificity in Codes].
[Vol. 65AFTERWORD
rules and imposing sanctions.4  Finally, as noted above, there are now
a large number of institutions that actively assert at least some regula-
tory jurisdiction  over lawyers, and an even greater number that could
enter the field in the  future.  Given  this  dizzying  array of functions,
tasks, and potential players, how should one go about comparing reg-
ulatory competence?
Who  Should  Regulate Lawyers?  attempts  to  develop  a  general
framework for comparing four broad categories  of regulatory institu-
tions.'  Ted Schneyer raises four criticisms  to this framework.6  These
criticisms underscore important difficulties in any comparative institu-
tional  analysis.  I  therefore  use  Schneyer's  objections  in  a  slightly
reconfigured  form, to discuss three  methodological  questions  regard-
ing the kind of scholarship to which this Symposium is dedicated:  (1)
Is it permissible  to compare regulatory institutions  on some, but not
all, of the tasks or functions that these institutions might serve, and if
so, which tasks or functions can profitably be isolated?; (2) What is the
role of evolutionary  development in  either the structure  or the func-
tioning of a given institution  in a  comparative  analysis?;  and  (3)  Do
categorical  distinctions concerning  either subgroups  within the bar or
particular  kinds  of regulatory  problems  help  to  clarify  institutional
choices?
A.  Comparing  Regulatory Tasks
Who Should Regulate Lawyers? makes the counterfactual  assump-
tion that all enforcement actions are based on a single set of substan-
tive  rules,  to  wit,  either  the  ABA's  Model  Rules  of  Professional
Conduct or Model Code of Professional Responsibility.7  Having thus
artificially bracketed  arguments over  the substantive  content of ethi-
cal  rules  (which I refer to  as  "content"  arguments),  the  article  com-
pares  sanctioning  systems  along  two  dimensions:  "compliance"
arguments which examine the relative ability of each of the systems to
detect and deter lawyer  delicts at the lowest possible cost; and "inde-
pendence"  arguments  which  examine  whether  subjecting  lawyers  to
each of the four controls would either promote  or undermine profes-
sional independence.'
Schneyer and other authors in the Symposium criticize  this analytic
framework  on two  related fronts.  First, several  authors  question  the
decision to bracket content arguments.9 These arguments, they assert,
4. See Schneyer,  Foreword,  supra note 2,  at 38-39.
5.  See  Wilkins,  Who  Should  Regulate  Lawyers?, supra  note  1, at  804-19.
Schneyer  concisely  summarizes  the major points  of this framework.  See  Schneyer,
Foreword, supra note 2, at 48-50.
6.  See Schneyer, Foreword,  supra note 2, at 53-56.
7.  Wilkins,  Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, supra note 1, at  810-11.
8.  See id. at 809-14.
9.  See Schneyer, Foreword,  supra  note 2, at 53-58; see also Bruce A. Green, Con-
flicts of Interest in Litigation: The Judicial  Role, 65 Fordham L  Rev. 71,  82-83 (1996)
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are  often  at the  heart  of disputes  about  regulatory  authority.  Thus,
Schneyer claims that the Seventh Circuit's decision to impose height-
ened burdens on plaintiffs seeking to bring third party claims against
lawyers for aiding  and abetting  violations  of the  securities  laws  was
more a dispute over the content of a lawyer's professional  obligations
than  a decision  about  the propriety  of using  liability controls  to  en-
force existing rules of professional conduct.1 0  Similarly, Professor Lit-
tle  points  out  that  the  most  contentious  issues  relating  to  the
regulation  of  federal  prosecutors  involve  the  Justice  Department's
claim that these lawyers  are no longer subject to the ABA's version of
the anti-contact rules."  For his part, Professor Green argues that the
decision concerning  what role courts should play  in policing conflicts
of interest in litigation depends upon whether courts replace  the cate-
gorical  prohibitions  contained  in  the  Model  Rules  with  their  own
open-textured standards geared towards protecting the integrity of the
trial process.' 2
Professor  Green's  article  also highlights  a  second  criticism  of  my
framework,  one  grounded  in  inclusion  rather  than  exclusion.  As
Schneyer points out, my framework treats questions about the appro-
priateness of particular sanctions as a subcategory of compliance argu-
ments.'3  Professor Green contends, however, that the character of the
sanction should be treated as a separate  question.  Thus,  although he
agrees with me that courts should play an important role in enforcing
the  existing  conflict  rules, he  argues  that  disqualification  is not  the
appropriate  sanction.  Instead,  Green  asserts that courts  should  im-
pose monetary penalties on lawyers who violate the Model  Code, re-
serving  disqualification  for  those  cases  where  continued
representation  threatens  the  integrity  of  the  trial  process.  Indeed,
Schneyer  implies  that  comparisons  about  institutional  competence
should take into account six different "sub-tasks" associated with pro-
fessional regulation:  rulemaking,  rule interpretation,  violation detec-
tion,  guilt  determination,  sanctions  designing,  and  sanctions
imposition.'4
These related  criticisms highlight the difficulty of  isolating particu-
lar regulatory functions.  As I acknowledged  in Who Should Regulate
Lawyers?, content arguments  are often what is really at stake in  the
[hereinafter  Green,  The Judicial Role] (stressing  the need  to consider  the content  of
the standards used in setting the rules); Rory K. Little, Who Should Regulate the Eth-
ics of Federal  Prosecutors?,  65 Fordham L. Rev. 355, 412-14  (1996)  [hereinafter Little,
Federal Prosecutors] (discussing  the inadequacy  of the  Wilkins model in addressing
the realities  of multiple rules, substantive content of rules and multiple enforcement
bodies).
10.  See Schneyer, Foreword,  supra note 2,  at 56.
11.  See Little, Federal  Prosecutors,  supra note  9,  at 367-68, 408-10.
12.  See Green,  The Judicial  Role, supra note  9,  at 95-97.
13.  See Schneyer, Foreword, supra note 2, at 48.
14.  See id. at 38.
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rightly points out, institutions often get into the enforcement business
because they have adopted a particular rule and therefore believe that
they now have to enforce it. 6  Other enforcement debates turn on the
appropriateness  of  particular  sanctions.  Thus,  many  commentators
contended that the most troubling aspect of the Office of Thrift Super-
vision ("OTS")  assertion of regulatory authority in the Kaye, Scholer
case was the "freeze order" that set conditions on the law firm's abil-
ity to distribute its assets. 7  Similarly, prior to the 1993 Amendments
to Rule 11, many critics charged that the Rule's reliance on monetary
sanctions produced most of the Rule's negative consequences.'
Nevertheless,  there are  important  reasons not  to conflate  content
and  compliance  arguments.  Professor  Brickman's  attack  on  the
ABA's  Advisory  Opinion  regarding  contingency  fees  is  a  case  in
point.  Professor Brickman frames his critique as an attack on the self-
interested nature of self-regulation.19  On these grounds, his disagree-
ment is not so much with the content of Rule 1.5,  prohibiting a lawyer
from  charging  an "unreasonable  fee,"  but  rather  with  the  Advisory
Committee's  claim that lawyers  who charge standard contingent  fees
should not be disciplined  for violating  this  norm.  As  Susan  Koniak
notes  in her Response, however, Brickman also  supports a legislative
initiative that would substantially alter the substantive rules regulating
how plaintiff lawyers  litigate  contingency fee  cases. 0  Although  Pro-
fessor  Brickman  undoubtedly  believes  that  the  same  self-interested
bias  affects  the ABA's  legislative  and  enforcement  roles,  this  is far
from self-evident.  Professor Koniak persuasively argues that there are
good reasons why even a disinterested decision maker might reject the
content argument that a rule requiring  plaintiffs  to seek early settle-
ments in every case-and to reject such offers at their peril-is in the
best interests of  either the clients  of contingency  fee  lawyers  or the
15.  See Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, supra note  1, at 809.
16.  See Schneyer, Foreword,  supra note 2, at 42-47.
17.  See Steve France, Just Deserts: Don't Cry for Kaye  Scholer, Legal Times, Apr.
6, 1992, at 28 (noting that stories about the case  featured a "Greek chorus"  of senior
law firm partners  and academics  complaining  about  the freeze-order).
18.  See, eg., Melissa L. Nelken, Sanctions Under Amended Federal  Rule 11-Some
"Chilling" Problems in the Struggle Between Compensation and Punishment,  74 Geo.
LJ. 1313,  1314  (1986)  (evaluating  the  "compensation-punishment  dichotomy"  and
suggesting that nonmandatory  sanctions better serve the purpose of the rule).
19.  See  Lester Brickman, ABA  Regulation of Contingency Fees:  Money  Talks,
Ethics Walks, 65 Fordham L. Rev. 247, 250-57  (1996)  [hereinafter Brickman,  Contin-
gency Fees].
20.  See Susan P. Koniak, Principled  Opinions: Response to Brickman,  65 Fordham
L. Rev. 337,  338-39  (1996)  [hereinafter  Koniak, Response to Brickman] (noting that
Brickman's  ABA  request  paralleled the legislative  initiative  he  supports  by asking
whether plaintiff's lawyers are ethically required to solicit early settlement offers from
defendants).
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litigation system as a whole.2'  She goes on, however, to conclude that
the  ABA's position  on how  the existing  norm should be interpreted
and enforced gives  credence  to Professor Brickman's  concerns.  This
raises a general question  about the role of interpretation.
Schneyer  correctly notes that the task of interpreting the scope of a
given  professional  rule  is  analytically  separate  from  the  task  of
rulemaking.22  What Schneyer fails  to note, however,  is the extent to
which this process is inextricably intertwined with enforcement.  As I
noted in Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, enforcement  officials invari-
ably exercise a certain amount of discretionary authority over the con-
tent  of professional  norms when they apply these  rules to particular
cases.23  This power to give a "substantive tilt" to a given content rule
is particularly evident in circumstances  where the norm is ambiguous,
incomplete, or in tension with other plausibly  applicable rules.  As all
of the  participants  in this  Symposium  acknowledge,  both  the Model
Code  and  the Model Rules  are filled  with such commands.
Two examples from this Symposium nicely illustrate the importance
of substantive tilt. First, Professor Little notes that the Attorney Gen-
eral's  actions  in  the  anti-contact  area  were  prompted  by a  series  of
cases  in  which  courts,  acting  under  their  supervisory  authority  over
lawyers,  sanctioned  federal  prosecutors  for violating  various  ethical
rules.24  Second, Schneyer notes that the  OTS's  authority to enforce
existing  ethics rules  against banking  lawyers  created  both an "in ter-
rorem" effect, which caused these lawyers to settle their disputes with
the agency prematurely,  and paved the way for more specific "proto-
cols"  that  will  have  to  be  enforced  in  agency  rulemaking
proceedings.25
Contrary to Schneyer's implication, however, these examples high-
light the  importance  of distinguishing  between  content  and  compli-
ance  arguments.  To  begin  with,  both  the  Justice  Department's
complaint  about  the court's  interpretation  of  the  anti-contact  rules,
and the degree  to which  OTS attempted  to  fit its allegations  against
Kaye, Scholer and other law firms into the existing framework of ethi-
cal  rules,  underscore  the  extent  to  which  the  Model  Code  and  the
Model  Rules  remain  the  preeminent  standards  of  ethical  conduct.
Although, as I acknowledged at the time, it is surely artificial to assert
that every  enforcement  official  agrees  that these are  the appropriate
standards, the ABA's formal pronouncements continue to be the stan-
21.  Id  at 350-52.  Indeed, in a related  context,  the Advisory Committee  for the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a group that would seem to be far less protective of
lawyer self-interest  than the ABA, has,  for reasons  analogous  to  the ones given  by
Professor Koniak, consistently resisted attempts to encourage early settlement offers
by expanding  the fee-shifting provisions of Rule 68.
22.  See Schneyer, Foreword,  supra note 2, at 38-39.
23.  See Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, supra note 1, at 810.
24.  See Little,  Federal  Prosecutors,  supra note 9,  at 361-63.
25.  See Schneyer, Foreword,  supra note 2, at 57-58.
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dard against which  all  other regulatory pronouncements  are judged.
Precisely because these rules are so widely accepted as binding, asser-
tions such as the Attorney General's that government lawyers  are no
longer  bound  by  these  prescriptions  are  universally  perceived  as
radical.
More  important,  rulemaking  still  provides  a  potential  mechanism
for correcting  substantive  tilt.  Although  there  is  no  "super-legisla-
ture" with the unquestioned  authority to adjudicate  disputes  such as
those now brewing between the ABA and the Justice Department, the
ABA's limited yet important success  at forcing dissenting institutions
to come to the bargaining table by threatening to invoke its rulemak-
ing authority demonstrates the power that the ABA still has to correct
"substantive  tilt" through the exercise of its legislative  power.26  Fur-
thermore, just because  there currently  is  no "super-legislature"  does
not mean  that  one  might  not  be  created  in  the  future.  As  Fred
Zacharias argues here and elsewhere, Congress has both the authority
and  the  competence  to  establish  uniform  conduct  rules  for  federal
prosecutors-and perhaps for the profession as a whole.27  If Congress
were to step  in and  definitively  resolve the reach of the  anti-contact
rules in this context, many of the problems Little identifies regarding
inconsistent interpretations  by federal courts in different jurisdictions
would  disappear.
Finally,  even in the absence of a "super-legislature"  it does not fol-
low, as Schneyer asserts, that a particular institution must take respon-
sibility for enforcing its own rules.2 8  Kaye, Scholer  provides a perfect
case in point.  In that case, OTS had the option of pursuing its claims
against  Kaye,  Scholer  either  in  an  administrative  enforcement  pro-
ceeding  or in the courts.29  Given  the potential for substantive  tilt in
an agency  enforcement  proceeding-particularly  with respect  to the
freeze-order-a  strong argument can be made that OTS should have
pursued  its claims  against the firm in a  forum that provided  a better
26.  See Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, supra note 1, at  811 (discussing
the power of rulemakers  to correct  substantive  tilt).  The attempt  by the ABA  Task
Force  on Lawyer's  Representation  of Regulated  Clients,  discussed  by  Schneyer, to
force OTS to submit "novel or non-traditional interpretations  of professional  codes"
to the  ABA  for "authoritative  rulings"  is a perfect  example  of this phenomena. See
Schneyer, Foreword,  supra note 2, at 58 n.124  (citations  omitted).
27.  See Zacharias, Response to Little, supra note 3, at 454-56 (arguing that Con-
gress is arguably the best entity  to regulate  the conduct  underlying  the "no-contact"
rule by legislatively creating a substantive standard that fairly balances the competing
interests  of prosecutors  and  defendants);  see also Fred  C.  Zacharias,  Federalizing
Legal Ethics, 73  Tex. L. Rev.  335  (1994)  [hereinafter  Zacharias,  Federalizing Legal
Ethics] (arguing that Congress probably has  the power to formulate national  ethical
standards).
28.  See Schneyer,  Foreword,  supra note 2,  at 58.
29.  See David B. Wilkins, Making Context Count: Regulating Lawyers After Kaye,
Scholer, 66 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1145,  1201-03  (1993)  [hereinafter  Wilkins.  Making Context
Count].
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opportunity for  Kaye,  Scholer  to challenge  the merits  of the  claims
brought against it.3 0
The presumption that enforcement  authority invariably follows leg-
islative  authority also undermines  several of the proposals presented
here.  For  example,  even  if  we  grant  that  the  Justice  Department
should be able to fashion its own anti-contact rule for federal prosecu-
tors,  it does not follow that this agency  should also be given the au-
thority  to  enforce  this  new  standard.  This  new  form  of  "self-
regulation"'31 is subject  to all  of the same  criticisms as  the traditional
system of professional  discipline that it is  designed  to replace.32  Pro-
fessor Painter's provocative proposal for contractually established  in-
dividualized  content  rules  for  agency  lawyers  also  suffers  from  the
assumption  that legislative  authority entails  enforcement  authority.33
Regardless  of the merits of this proposal  as a rulemaking device,  it is
far from clear that the agencies negotiating these individually tailored
contracts  are  in  the  best position to  enforce  their terms.  Although
Professor Painter's system depends upon  allowing each party to pun-
ish defections, a third party still has an important role in determining
whether  a defection  has in fact occurred.
Nor should one assume, as Brickman apparently does, that substan-
tive tilt created by decision-maker bias is only a problem for the ABA,
or, for that matter, any other single institutional actor.  Brickman  ar-
gues that no structural impediment prevented the ABA from using his
request for guidance  as an  occasion  to clarify  the reach  of Rule  1.5
and to further the public debate over contingent fees. 4  Instead,  the
Committee simply chose not to do so.  Sadly, such evasion is a predict-
able consequence  of the bar's control over this aspect  of the  discipli-
nary process.
30.  Of course, as Schneyer notes, making courts the ultimate sanctioning authority
will not necessarily  prevent what from the bar's perspective  appears to be substantive
tilt. See Schneyer, Foreword,  supra note 2, at 45-46.  As I argue below, however, this
possibility must be balanced against  the danger that the bar's  own enforcement  sys-
tem is biased in  the opposite direction.
31.  The Attorney General's  proposal  is  not  technically  "self-regulation"  as  that
term has  traditionally  been  defined since  the process  is  directly  controlled  by state
authorities rather than lawyers acting in their purely "professional"  capacity. See An-
drew Kaufman, Problems in Professional  Responsibility 532-46  (1989)  (rejecting  the
characterization  of the current disciplinary process as self-regulation).
32.  For a critique of the dangers  of "self-regulation"  in the traditional disciplinary
system, see Deborah L. Rhode, The Rhetoric of Professional  Reform, 45 Md. L. Rev.
274, 288-93  (1986).
33.  Richard  W. Painter, Game Theoretic and Contractarian  Paradigms  in the Un-
easy Relationship Between Regulators and Regulatory Lawyers, 65 Fordham  L. Rev.
149 (1996)  [hereinafter Painter,  Game Theoretic].
34.  See Brickman, Contingency Fees, supra  note 19, at 270-76.  Indeed, I have pre-
viously argued that clarifying the content  of ambiguous rules is the primary purpose
for such  advisory  opinions.  See David  B. Wilkins,  Legal Realism for Lawyers, 104
Harv. L. Rev. 468, 501-03  (1990)  [hereinafter  Wilkins, Legal Realism].
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Brickman  fails  to acknowledge, however, that the regulatory  goals
selected by the legislative controls he endorses will also be influenced
by  the  incentives  of  the  regulators.  Legislators,  executive  officials,
and even voters each have interests that are likely to affect their view
about the proper balance among competing regulatory goals.3  In this
case, it is  likely that the desire  on the  part of some state  officials  to
reduce  the  aggregate  amount  of  contingent  fee  litigation  will  bias
them against "standard" contingent fees and lead them to support en-
couraging  plaintiffs  to accept early settlement offers.  The point  here
simply  is that  every  control system  is  vulnerable  to  the institutional
incentives of those in charge.  Identifying these incentives, and explor-
ing their likely effect on potential regulatory goals, must, therefore, be
a primary goal of comparative  institutional analysis.36
Similarly,  Professor Green's  attempt to link  content arguments  to
questions about the appropriateness  of particular sanctions needlessly
complicates  his otherwise  sensible proposal for reducing  the harm  to
"innocent"  clients  from  successful  disqualification  motions.  At  the
heart of Green's argument is the claim that monetary sanction, rather
than disqualification,  is the appropriate  penalty for  lawyers who vio-
late the existing conflict rules.  It is this concern about disqualification
as a sanction that leads Professor Green to propose that courts adopt
a new substantive rule for imposing this remedy.  As Professor Martyn
argues, however, in his attempt to limit the use of disqualification as a
sanction, Professor Green advocates  a bifurcated process that runs the
risk  of  undermining  the  substantive  content  of  the  existing  conflict
rules in circumstances  where Green himself believes that they should
be applied.37  Thus,  given that judges  have  strong incentives to keep
cases moving at all costs, lawyers caught representing conflicting inter-
ests may receive little more than a nominal fine even in circumstances
where there is some measure of concrete harm  to third parties or to
the process.  Martyn, therefore, argues in favor of maintaining the ex-
isting substantive  standard  and instead  focusing  directly  on the issue
35.  See Susan P. Koniak,  The Law Between the Bar and the State, 70 N.C. L Rev.
1389  (1992).
36.  As Professors Ayres  and Silver emphasize,  however, it is important not to ro-
manticize  these incentives, either by confusing intentions with effects,  or by overem-
phasizing certain desirable attributes of particular regulators. See Ian Ayres, Response
to  Painter,  65  Fordham  L. Rev.  201,  203-04  (1996)  [hereinafter  Ayres,  Response to
Painter] (criticizing Professor Painter for being overly optimistic about the incentives
of agency  lawyers);  Charles  Silver, Professional  Liability Insurance as Insurance and
as Lawyer Regulation: Response to Davis, 65  Fordham  L  Rev. 233,  234-35  (1996)
[hereinafter Silver, Response to Davis] (criticizing  Mr. Davis for confusing  "justifica-
tions" with "effects").
37.  See  Susan  P.  Martyn, Developing the Judicial Role in  Controlling  Litigation
Conflicts: Response to Green, 65 Fordham L. Rev. 131,  133  (1996)  [hereinafter Mar-
tyn, Response to Green] (arguing  that "rational"  lawyers would be likely to perceive
Green's  proposal  as  substantially  lowering  their  chance  of  receiving  a substantial
sanction).
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of  the  appropriate  sanction  by giving judges  a  range  of sanctioning
authority, including disgorgement  of both past and present fees.38
Finally, the strength  of all  of these arguments  about content,  sub-
stantive  tilt, and sanctions  depend  in large part on one's views about
the  importance  of  professional  independence.  When  I  wrote  Who
Should Regulate Lawyers?, independence  arguments  occupied  a cen-
tral  place in the  debate over various  alternative  sanctioning  systems.
These arguments  are largely conspicuous by their absence in this col-
lection of essays.39  At one level,  this  is hardly surprising.  Tradition-
ally,  the most  vocal  advocates  of independence  arguments  have  the
kind  of faith  in  the  operation  of the  disciplinary  system  that  is  not
shared by  any  of the  participants  in  this  Symposium.  Nevertheless,
given that lawyers and policy makers continue to place a high value on
maintaining  professional  independence,  one  might have  expected  in-
dependence  arguments  to play a more prominent role.
Independence  arguments  deserve  an important  place  in  any com-
parative  evaluation  of  regulatory  systems.  Consider,  for  example,
Schneyer's  analysis  of  Barker  v.  Henderson, Franklin, Starnes &
Holt. 4  This was the first of a line of cases in which the  Seventh Cir-
cuit imposed additional restrictions  on plaintiffs seeking  to hold their
attorneys  liable  as  aiders  and  abettors  under  the  securities  laws.
Schneyer  asserts that this line of cases is really about rulemaking  au-
thority, rather  than,  as  I  argued  in  Who Should Regulate Lawyers?,
about  the  enforcement  of  existing  rules.4  Schneyer's  characteriza-
tion,  however,  depends  upon  the  validity  of  the  Seventh  Circuit's
stated  assumptions  about  professional  independence.  Thus,  the
Barker court rejected plaintiffs'  assertion that the lawyers  in that case
had violated existing ethics rules when they continued to represent the
client  after they became  aware  that material  facts  had not been  dis-
closed to the client's  auditors.42  The court reached  this conclusion  on
the ground that there was no evidence that any lawyer had "thrown  in
38.  Iad at 142.  The question  of whether "sanctions"  should be treated  as  a sepa-
rate inquiry from  enforcement authority  depends  upon the extent  to which we con-
ceive  of a given  institution  as being  able  to  employ an infinite  variety  of potential
sanctions.  I return  to  these issues in part II.
39.  Only  Professor  Koniak  expressly  discusses  the  importance  of  the  bar  as  an
institution  retaining  a  "healthy  measure  of independence  from  the  state."  Koniak,
Response to Brickman, supra note 20, at 347.  Koniak connects professional indepen-
dence to the preservation of individual  freedom in a democracy. Id. at 347-48.  Profes-
sor Little makes a classic separation of powers argument against federal  preemption
of a state court's inherent power to regulate the conduct of federal  prosecutors.  See
Little, Federal  Prosecutors,  supra note 9, at 408-09.  For a discussion of the importance
of both  "democratic theory" and "separation of powers"  arguments  in the lexicon of
independence  claims, see Wilkins,  Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, supra note  1,  at
853-63.
40.  797 F.2d 490 (7th Cir. 1986), discussed in Schneyer, Foreword,  supra note 2, at
[28-29].
41.  See Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, supra note 1, at 809-14.
42.  See Barker,  supra note 40, at  493.
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his lot with the primary violators."43  This requirement  that the law-
yers  and clients  become  co-venturers  in  the client's  fraud,  however,
appears  nowhere in Rule 1.2(d)."  Instead, the Seventh Circuit's con-
clusion  rests  on  the  assumption  that  professionals  such  as  lawyers
would not risk their reputations  to involve  themselves  in  fraudulent
schemes  unless they received  more  in compensation  than their stan-
dard  fees."  This  assumption,  however,  undervalues  the  substantial
pressures  on  lawyers  such  as  those in Barker to satisfy their clients'
demands.'  Indeed,  it  is  precisely  in  circumstances  such  as  these-
where  client pressures  are strong, where the  relevant  norm  ("know-
ingly assisting" client fraud)  is vague and open-ended,  and the risk of
sanction  from other enforcement  systems  is  low  (disciplinary  bodies
rarely sanction these kinds of externality violations)-that we want to
reinforce a lawyer's commitment to professional independence.  If the
lawyers  in  Barker had  independently  evaluated  both  their  client's
goals and the public purposes underlying  legal rules, they might  have
refused to continue representing  a client whose refusal to disclose ma-
terial information to its auditors, although arguably legal, nevertheless
undermines long-term  legal values.
Another well-known securities  case, In re Carter  & Johnson, nicely
illustrates the point. 4 7  In that case, two partners at a large New York
law firm continued to assist their clients in filing documents and  issu-
ing public statements  even though  both knew that the  company had
failed to disclose material  information,  and both had counseled  their
client  that  disclosure  was  necessary  to  avoid violating  the  securities
laws.4s  After  years  of litigation, the SEC rejected  the claim  that the
lawyers  conduct  violated  existing  ethical  standards,  partly  on  the
ground that the ethics rules did not create a duty to disclose what they
knew about their clients' actions.4 9 Nevertheless, from the perspective
of  professional  independence,  it would  have  been  preferable  if the
lawyers had refused to continue working until their advice on disclo-
sure was followed, thereby making it more difficult for their client to
43.  Id at 497.
44.  See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.2(d)  (1994)  ("A lawyer shall
not..  . assist a client[ ] in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal  or fraudulent.").
As the commentary  to the Rule makes clear, this prohibition applies even in circum-
stances where the Rules instruct the lawyer not to reveal the information. See id. Rule
1.2(d) cmt.  ("The lawyer  is not  permitted  to reveal the client's  wrongdoing,  except
where  permitted by Rule  1.6.  The lawyer  is required, however, to  avoid  furthering
the purpose ....  Withdrawal  from representation...  may be required.").
45.  See In re VMS  Sec. Litig., 752 F. Supp. 1373,  1401 (N.D.  Il.  1990)  (noting that
"[t]he  Seventh Circuit has twice acknowledged  that the potential injury to a defend-
ant's reputation for integrity far outweighs  any possible gain from retaining a client").
46.  See Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, supra note 1, at 849.
47.  Exchange  Act Release  No.  17,597  [1981  Transfer Binder]  Fed.  Sec. L Rep.
(CCH)  82,847  (Feb. 28,  1981).  I discuss  this case  in some detail in Wilkins,  Who
Should Regulate Lawyers?, supra note  1, at 836-37.
48. Id  at 836-37.
49.  Id at 837.
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undermine the purposes of the securities laws.  This result, however, is
far less likely to occur if lawyers  acting in this position face no credible
threat that their interpretation  of the limits of Rule 1.2(d) will be sub-
ject to rigorous  ex post review.  By restricting  the role of the institu-
tions that might otherwise  have the ability and incentive  to engage in
this kind  of review,  decisions like Barker, and the  Supreme  Court's
recent  abrogation  of aiding  and abetting  liability under Rule  10(b)5
for all parties,5" make it less likely that lawyers will embrace this form
of publicly-motivated  independence.
Having made these points in defense of my framework, it is impor-
tant to emphasize  that no attempt to isolate regulatory tasks can ever
be entirely successful.  Nor, however, is it possible to consider all regu-
latory tasks simultaneously.  As Professor Zacharias notes, these goals
may often be in conflict.51  Thus, to take just one  example, even if we
accept  that  Professor  Painter's  proposed  regime  of individual  con-
tracting will increase the gains from cooperation, his suggestion is still
less  likely  to  generate  the  kind  of publicly  accessible  information
about lawyer conduct that can provide useful guidance to other practi-
tioners or contribute to the public debate over regulatory  goals.  As I
have argued elsewhere, providing this kind of information is an impor-
tant by-product of enforcement proceedings.5  In addition, as Profes-
sor  Ayres  points  out  in  his  response,  to  the  extent  that  Painter's
proposal includes a  move away from the regime of default standards
supplemented  by  common  law  interpretation  currently  in  place  in
many  administrative  settings,  it may  also  diminish,  rather  than  pro-
mote, overall compliance.53
None  of this, of course, should be taken to deny the importance of
comparative studies that focus on content arguments  directly.  More-
over, as I indicated at the outset, in some circumstances one may have
to reach  a judgment about the proper content of professional  norms,
or about rulemaking competence  more generally,  before one will feel
comfortable  about  reaching  an  all-things-considered  judgment about
the  propriety  of various forms  of professional  regulation.  My point
simply  is  that  any  sensible  comparative  analysis  must  hold  certain
50.  See Central  Bank v. First Interstate  Bank, 511 U.S.  164  (1994).  For a discus-
sion of the implications of Central Bank on law suits against lawyers, see Ann Maxey,
Competing Duties? Securities Lawyers' Liability After Central Bank, 64 Fordham L.
Rev. 2185  (1996).
51. See Zacharias, Response to Little, supra note 3, at 461; Zacharias, Specificity in
Codes, supra note 3.
52.  See Wilkins,  Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, supra note 1, at 883-86.
53. See Ayres, Response to Painter,  supra note  36, at 207.  Both the  OTS and the
SEC employ broad standards such as "good faith" and "professional conduct"  as de-
fault rules for lawyers  appearing before these  agencies. See Wilkins, Making Context
Count, supra note  29,  at  1197-98  (describing  OTS  enforcement  practices);  Wilkins,
Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, supra note 1, at 835-37  (describing  the SEC's Rule
2(e)).
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things fixed so that others may be brought clearly into view.  The same
applies to the definition  of institutional structure.
B.  Institutional Definition
Schneyer  correctly notes that one of the central  questions raised  in
any comparative  institutional analysis  is  how the various institutions
should  be  defined.  In  traditional  legal  process  analysis,  institutions
such  as  "courts,"  "legislatures,"  and  "administrative  agencies"  were
defined  at  a high level  of abstraction  using formalist  criteria.,  The
articles in this Symposium,  on the other hand, primarily examine spe-
cific institutions and their handling of particular problems.  Professor
Brickman,  for example,  concentrates  on  the  ABA's  Committee  on
Ethics  and Professional  Responsibility,  while Anthony  Davis  exam-
ines the role of liability insurance companies.  My own  article falls  in
between these two poles.  Thus, my four sanctioning systems (discipli-
nary controls, liability  controls,  institutional controls,  and  legislative
controls), were meant to incorporate the full range of institutions that
might regulate lawyer conduct.  At the same  time, by discussing  con-
crete examples  within these general  categories, I  attempted  to move
the  debate  over  professional  regulation  away  from  the abstract  and
often conclusory  level that existed in much of the literature.
The articles  and responses in this Symposium  make it clear  that I
was not entirely successful in striking this balance.  On the one hand,
the framework does not fully account  for the ever-growing number of
institutions that assert some form of regulatory control over lawyers.
For example, although the four sanctioning systems were meant to be
read against the backdrop  of what I referred to as the embedded con-
trol of the market, I used client sophistication  (as represented  by the
distinction between  individual and corporate  clients)  as  the principal
proxy for this form  of control.  Anthony  Davis's article  underscores
that this way of defining market controls ignores the substantial regu-
latory  power that  actors such  as insurance  companies exert  over the
profession. 5  Similarly, neither disciplinary  controls  nor institutional
controls fully captures the kind of modified  self-regulation, described
by Rory Little, involved in the Attorney General's  attempts to regu-
late the conduct  of federal prosecutors. 
6
54.  For the basic statement of the legal process school, see Henry M. Hart, Jr. &
Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process:  Basic Problems in the Making and Application
of Law (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds. 1994).  For a critique of the
abstract and formal level at which the institutional analysis  was conducted,  see Ed-
ward L. Rubin, Institutional  Analysis and the New Legal Process, 1995  Vis.  L Rev.
463.
55.  Anthony E. Davis, Professional  Liability Insurers as Regulators of Law Prac-
tice, 65 Fordham  L. Rev. 209, 211  (1996).
56.  Indeed, as Professor Little ruefully notes,  my framework  fails to include fed-
eral prosecutors at all. See Little, Federal  Prosecutors,  supra note 9, at  357-58.  As  I
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On  the  other hand,  Ted  Schneyer  correctly  notes  that  by  aban-
doning  the kind of ideal  types employed  by traditional legal process
scholars  in favor  of an examination  of actual-and  even potential-
practice,  my framework  runs the  risk  of  "fudging"  the  comparative
analysis by treating some aspects of a given system as immutable while
imagining  plausible  changes  in  others.-"  Schneyer  overstates  this
charge.  For  example,  in  contending  that  I  "cannot  conceive"  of
changes  that might improve  the operation  of the disciplinary  system,
Schneyer overlooks the fact that I both expressly consider the reforms
to that system proposed,  but as  of yet unadopted,  by the ABA58 and
endorse the very move towards holding law firms responsible for dis-
ciplinary violations  (as  opposed  to individual practitioners)  that Pro-
fessor  Schneyer  has  successfully  championed. 59  Nevertheless,  the
problem he identifies  remains:  in  a  world  in  which  both regulatory
authority and institutional  structures are in flux, how  can we identify
those aspects of a given institution that are essential to its operation as
opposed to those that are subject  to change?
Who Should Regulate Lawyers? does not purport to provide a com-
prehensive answer to this question, nor can I provide one here.  Nor, I
should note, do any of the other authors in this Symposium.  Clearly,
existing  practice  constitutes  the  primary touchstone.  This  is particu-
larly  true  if  efforts  to  reform  these  practices  have  been  tried  and
failed.  Thus, as Schneyer notes, there is no inherent reason why disci-
plinary agencies  could not become more proactive or that greater ef-
forts could not be made to encourage knowledgeable parties to report
misconduct to these bodies.  Nevertheless, attempts to achieve both of
these goals  have  been largely  unsuccessful.  Persistent  financial  con-
straints continue to hamper the ability of disciplinary bodies to engage
in proactive investigations, just as efforts to encourage lawyers, judges,
and other knowledgeable insiders to report misconduct to disciplinary
bodies have yielded  few results.  Moreover,  these failures seem likely
to continue because  they are consistent with the incentives created by
this form  of control.
As  I argued  above,  the  regulatory  incentives  surrounding  a  given
control system will have a profound  effect on the system's operation.
These incentives can be changed only with difficulty.  Thus, so long as
the  bar continues  to exert  substantial influence  over  the  disciplinary
system, it is unlikely that this form of control will ever value external-
ity problems as highly as agency problems.  The image of the lawyer as
the  client's  champion  stands  at  the  heart  of  the  bar's  view  of  the
discuss in the next section, this omission has important consequences  for other parts
of my analytic framework  as well.
57.  See Schneyer, Foreword,  supra note 2, at 54.
58.  See Wilkins, Who  Should Regulate Lawyers?, supra note 1, at  805  n.19  (dis-
cussing  the changes  proposed  by the ABA's MacKay  Report).
59.  See id. at 874  n.323.
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world.6"  This image has had a lasting effect on the development  of the
current disciplinary  system.  As  Professor Mark  Roe argues  in a  re-
lated context, decisions  about institutional priorities made by one set
of decision makers in response to a perceived set of problems  radiate
effects  long after  the  historical  contingencies  that gave  rise  to these
decisions have passed.61  Although disciplinary controls have  evolved
a long way from their traditional roots  as  the way for the  organized
bar  to  demonstrate  its  legitimacy  and  its  concern  for client  rights,
those original structures and purposes continue to shape the direction
of contemporary  developments.  Thus, it is not surprising that the re-
forms proposed by the MacKay  Commission  and every other official
body  that  has  examined  the  disciplinary  process  concentrate  on
agency  problems,  primarily  those  affecting  individual  clients.
Although it might be possible to break the grip of this path of the past,
doing  so will  inevitably involve  efficiency costs.
This  last  point  highlights  the  benefit  of comparative  institutional
analysis.  The  point  is  not  simply  whether  various  control  systems
could address  particular  problems,  but  rather  which  mechanism  is
most likely to control these problems at the lowest possible cost, mea-
sured  in  terms  of  both  compliance  and  independence  arguments.
Thus, the argument that disciplinary  controls should concentrate  pri-
marily on individual  agency problems  does not assume,  as Schneyer
seems to  imply, that  it is  impossible  to  imagine  this  control  system
addressing  corporate externality problems.  Instead,  all  that is neces-
sary to support this conclusion is that other enforcement systems have
a  comparative  advantage with respect  to these latter problems.  For
the  reasons  spelled  out  in  Who  Should Regulate Lawyers?, liability
and institutional  controls have this kind  of comparative  advantage.
Nevertheless,  as Schneyer  correctly notes, there is  nothing inevita-
ble about this fact.  The Supreme Court and various  lower courts,  as
well as the SEC and the OTS, have recently cut back on the ability of
both liability and institutional controls to address  various  externality
problems.62  The point  of  a  comparative  institutional  analysis,  how-
ever, is to suggest that these restrictions  are misguided.
C.  Categorical  Rules Versus Case-by-Case Analysis
Schneyer's final two criticisms relate to the usefulness of categorical
judgments about various forms  of professional  regulation.  The com-
parative institutional analysis  in Who Should Regulate Lawyers? rests
on two kinds  of categorical judgments:  the judgment  that there are important  differences  between  lawyers  who  represent  corporations
and  those  who  work for  individuals;  and  the  claim  that  there  is  an
60.  See Rhode, supra note 32.
61.  See Mark J. Roe,  Chaos and Evolution in Law and Economics, 109 Harv. L
Rev. 641,  643-62  (1996).
62.  See, e.g.,  sources cited in Schneyer, Foreword,  supra note 2, at 48 n.72.
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important  distinction between  agency  problems  affecting  clients  and
externality  problems  that harm  third  parties  or the  public  at  large.
Schneyer attacks these categorical judgments  on two fronts.  First, he
questions  the  usefulness  of  these  categories  in  particular  circum-
stances.  More generally, he wonders whether categories such as these
are sufficiently nuanced  to determine  actual  enforcement choices.
There is merit to each  of these arguments.  Given the inherent am-
biguity and uncertainty over who is the prosecutor's "client,"  (is it the
current  administration,  the  electorate,  the  public interest?),  catego-
rizing misconduct in terms of agency and externality  violations is par-
ticularly  problematic.63  Similarly,  as  Professors  Green  and  Martyn
demonstrate, in  the context  of conflicts  of interest it is impossible  to
draw a bright line between agency and externality problems.64  Never-
theless,  the  distinction  between these  two kinds  of lawyer  delicts  is
important, and failing to take note of it weakens arguments  about the
relative value of various control systems.65
Consider,  for example, Davis's proposals for increasing  the  use of
insurance contracts as regulatory devices.  This form of market regula-
tion is  expressly  tied to  the operation  of the litigation  system.  That
system,  however,  is  heavily  weighted  toward  suits by injured  clients
claiming agency  violations.66  Given this underlying reality, insurance
regulation  is likely to entrench  even further the importance  of advo-
63.  See Little, Federal  Prosecutors,  supra  note 9, at 416.  This is just another exam-
ple of the fact that my framework was not designed to deal with the unique problems
encountered by federal prosecutors.
64.  See Green,  The Judicial Role, supra note 9, at 88-89  (noting that conflicts  of
interest are "in the very least" a hybrid between agency and externality conduct, and,
from the perspective  of the "current or former client who is  not represented  in  the
litigation"  they are best characterized  as externality  problems); Martyn,  Response to
Green, supra note  37,  at  132  (endorsing  a  similar  description).  For  the  record,
although  I agree  with Professors  Green and Martyn  that conflicts  of interest can be
classified as externality problems if one views the current or former client whose law-
yer represents  another client with opposing interests as a "third party," such a charac-
terization seems strained in light of the fact that these "victims"  are entitled to object
to  the lawyer's actions  precisely because the lawyer continues to  owe them fiduciary
duties.  Failing to carry out a fiduciary  obligation to present or former clients consti-
tutes the  essence of agency problems.  What  makes  conflict situations  both  unique
and  difficult  is  that  there  are  at  least  two  sets  of  potentially  confficting  agency
problems at stake.
65.  For example, Professors  Macey and Miller's argument  that agency regulation
poses a unique threat to the lawyers for regulated industries rests on the  implicit as-
sumption that preventing  agency problems  is the only relevant  regulatory  goal. See
Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Reflections on Professional  Responsibility in
a Regulatory State, 63 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1105  (1995); see also Monroe H. Freedman,
Kaye Scholer-Overzealous or Overblown?, 35 S. Tex. L. Rev. 577 (1994)  (discussing
the Kaye,  Scholer case and concluding  that the  OTS shifted blame for its  regulatory
failures).
66.  See Note, Developments in the Law:  Lawyers' Responsibilities and Lawyers'
Responses, 107  Harv. L. Rev.  1547, 1557-81  (1994).  As  I indicated above, recent  de-
velopments  are likely to accentuate  that disparity. See supra  note 62 and accompany-
ing  text.
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cacy  duties  over  those  owed to  the public  or the  legal  system.  This
result seems particularly likely for solo or small firm lawyers who gen-
erally do not have the bargaining  power  to modify  the risk-reducing
restrictions imposed  by their insurers.
Indeed, once one considers the background conditions facing partic-
ular lawyers  and clients, even regulatory reforms that are specifically
directed at preventing either agency or externality problems may actu-
ally end up producing the opposite result.  Thus, once  one recognizes
that individual clients are generally unable adequately  to monitor and
evaluate the amount of effort their lawyer is exerting on their behalf,
Professor Brickman's admirable attempt to prevent price gouging via
the "standard" contingent fee (a classic agency problem) may unfortu-
nately exacerbate  the tendency  for  personal  injury  lawyers  to settle
quickly rather than fighting to obtain the maximum  recovery for their
clients.67  At the opposite pole, Painter's attempt to reduce the incen-
tive for lawyers  representing regulated entities to encourage  their cli-
ents  to  defect  from  socially  beneficial  cooperative  schemes  with
regulators (a classic externality problem) may backfire once one takes
into  account  Professor  Ayres's  trenchant  observation  that  clients
would  have  to be part of the kind of individualized  negotiations  be-
tween agency and firm lawyers Painter envisions.68  Thus, in order for
there to be "public"  gains  from such  an arrangement,  these  lawyers
must  convince  their  sophisticated  repeat-player  clients  both  of the
value of cooperating with regulators and of the firm's  ability to credi-
bly  signal  to their  regulatory  counterparts  that  they  are  keeping  up
their end of the bargain.  As Gilson and  Mnookin  argue in  a  related
context, however, both halves of this equation are likely to be difficult
in the context of the kind of large firms  and sophisticated  clients who
populate the federal regulatory environment.69  To the extent that the
lawyers fail to convince their clients on either issue, the "payoff" from
Painter's scheme may be that it is even more difficult than it is today
for lawyers for regulated entities  to resist client pressures  to subvert
systemic values for short term gain.70
Even if one accepts  the analytic  scheme I propose  in Who Should
Regulate Lawyers?, these categories  are  still too  general  to produce
judgments about the proper scope  of professional regulation that will
be valid  for "all  aspects  of all  cases  in  the category. '7 1  As  William
Simon argues  in a related context, however, the same criticism can be
67. See Koniak, Response to Brickman, supra note 20, at  340 n.19.
68.  See Ayres, Response to Painter,  supra note 36,  at 205-06.
69. See Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Disputing Through Agents:  Co-
operation and Conflict Between Lawyers in Litigation, 94 Colum. L Rev. 509 (1994).
70.  See Robert W. Gordon, The Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U. L Rev. 1, 11-
13  (1988)  (arguing that strong and immutable  professional norms  give lawyers some
protection  against the antisocial demands  of powerful clients).
71.  Schneyer, Foreword,  supra note 2, at 53.
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raised against any categorical scheme.72  By their very nature, categor-
ical  rules  are inherently  over and under inclusive.  As a result,  even
though liability and institutional controls are better at handling  most
corporate  externality  problems  than  the current  disciplinary  system,
there may be some problems  of this kind that would be better served
by the kind of enlightened  disciplinary system Professor Schneyer ad-
vocates.  Although  some  of these  problems  can  be addressed  by  al-
lowing  enforcement  officials  to  make  more  refined  contextual
judgments  at  the point  of  enforcement,73  the potential  for over  and
under inclusion  remains.
Nevertheless,  context-specific  categories  tend to reduce  arguments
about over and under inclusion.  This  brings us to the second  issue  I
would like to discuss.
II.  WHY  CONTEXT  COUNTS
A comparative institutional analysis in the field of professional reg-
ulation  need  not  advocate  a  context-based  approach  to  either
rulemaking or  enforcement.  The bar, for  example,  has  traditionally
come  to  the opposite  conclusion.  Nevertheless,  the  central premise
underlying Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, as well as most of the rest
of my work, is that the traditional claim that a uniform set of ethical
rules and enforcement practices governs  all lawyers  in all  contexts  is
both descriptively false and normatively unattractive.74  As a descrip-
tive matter, the universal claims of the traditional model are belied by
two features  of contemporary  law practice.  First, the  increasing spe-
cialization  and diversification among lawyers  and clients renders  any
single  image  of  the  lawyer/client  relationship,  e.g.,  the  traditional
model's  implicit image  of a solo  practitioner representing an individ-
72.  See William  H. Simon, Should Lawyers Obey the Law?, 38 Win.  & Mary L.
Rev.  (forthcoming  1996)  [hereinafter  Simon,  Should Lawyers  Obey the Law?]; see
also William H. Simon, Ethical  Discretion  in Lawyering, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1083, 1090-
91  (1988)  [hereinafter Simon, Ethical  Discretion] (criticizing a categorical  approach).
73.  See Wilkins,  Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, supra note  1, at 877-79.
74.  See id. at 873-86  (arguing in  favor of a  multi-door  enforcement  policy  that
accounts for differences  in lawyer/client  contexts); see also Wilkins,  Making Context
Count, supra note 29,  at 1216-17  (calling for the recognition  of a paradigm  shift to-
wards a context-based regulatory mechanism for lawyers who represent federally  in-
sured financial institutions); Wilkins, Legal Realism, supra  note 34, at 470 (advocating
context-specific  "middle-level"  interpretive and regulatory principles as a response to
the indeterminacy of many ethical rules).  My work on the social structure of the bar
and on the relationship between identity and professional role  is similarly concerned
with context. See, e.g.,  David B.  Wilkins,  Why Are  There So  Few Black Lawyers in
Corporate  Law Firms? An Institutional  Analysis, 84 Cal. L. Rev. 493 (1996)  (arguing
that law firm integration is a product of the institutional structure of firms); David B.
Wilkins,  Two Paths to the Mountaintop? The Role of Legal Education in Shaping the
Values of Black Corporate Lawyers, 45  Stan. L. Rev.  1981,  1983-85  (1993)  (arguing
that racial identity  plays a role in creating moral  obligations).
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ual client, inaccurate  and misleading."  At the same time, the prolifer-
ation of formal  and informal  regulatory mechanisms  directed  either
expressly  or  as  a practical  matter at particular  subgroups  within the
profession belies any suggestion that these diverse lawyers and clients
are  subject  to  a  unitary  set  of  normative  rules  and  enforcement
practices.
At the normative level, the traditional model's facade  of universal-
ity can only be maintained by ignoring differences among lawyers, cli-
ents,  and practice  settings that plausibly  affect  the feasibility  and/or
the  desirability  of  applying  particular  ethical  rules  or  enforcement
practices, or both, in particular contexts.  As a result, traditional ethics
discourse has tended to be structured around the limiting case-crimi-
nal defense, or, even more specifically, indigent criminal defense.76  To
the extent that a given ethical norm or enforcement practice would be
problematic  in  this context, regulators  have  traditionally  been  reluc-
tant to apply it in  any other  (even where the unique dangers  associ-
ated with the representation  of indigent criminals are not present) for
fear of creating a slippery slope that will undermine important profes-
sional values in the criminal  context.
A contextual  approach to professional regulation, however, creates
its own problems.  At one  level, the move  to context  seems to deny
that there  are  any  common  features  about  the  lawyer's  role  or the
practice of law.7  At the same time, once one  embraces context, it is
not clear which of the infinite number of contextual differences among
particular lawyers, clients, and regulatory settings are relevant and for
which purposes.78  By denying those aspects  of the lawyer's  role that
cut across  practice settings,  while at the same  time encouraging  law-
yers and other interested parties  to view every situation as unique, a
contextual approach to legal ethics runs the risk of either reducing the
legal  profession  to a  series  of fiefdoms  in  which  discrete  subgroups
fight over ethics for their own  selfish purposes, or of producing  a to-
tally decentralized  system  based  on some  combination  of individual
conscience  and private contract.79
75.  See David  B. Wilkins,  Everyday Practice is the Troubling  Case:  Confronting
Context in Legal Ethics, in Everyday Practice and Trouble Cases (A. Sarat, ed., North-
western  University  Press)  (forthcoming  1997)  [hereinafter  Wilkins,  Everyday
Practice].
76.  See David Luban, Lawyers and Justice:  An Ethical Study 60-66 (1988)  (noting
and criticizing the importance  of criminal  defense  to legal ethics).
77.  See Thomas D. Morgan  & Robert W. Tuttle, Legal Representation in a Plural-
ist Society, 63 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 984, 998-99 n.77 (1995)  (criticizing my call for "mid-
die-level principles"  on this ground).
78.  See Martha  Minow  & Elizabeth  V.  Spelman, In  Context, 63  S. Cal. L  Rev.
1597 (1990)  (discussing the problem of deciding which contextual factors are relevant
for which purposes).
79.  For the claim  that context-specific  rules and  enforcement  practices  facilitate
capture by either lawyers or regulators, see Freedman, supra note 65 (arguing that the
OTS's enforcement action against Kaye, Scholer captured and distorted legal ethics);
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This  interrelated  set  of  concerns,  which  I  will  call  the  specificity
problem,  poses  an important  challenge  to developing  a  context-spe-
cific account of legal ethics and professional regulation.  Nevertheless,
although it seems paradoxical, acknowledging  these concerns  should
make  us more, not less, willing to discard the universalizing  assump-
tions  of the traditional model.  To see why, we must examine  what is
really  at  stake  with respect  to  each  pole  of the  specificity  problem:
that context undermines important universal values and that a contex-
tual  system is administratively  unworkable  or undesirable.
The first thing to notice about the first of these objections,  that the
move towards context implicitly denies and perhaps  even undermines
normative  commitments  that ought  to unite  all  lawyers,  is  that  it is
itself  an  argument  from  context.  Those  who  assert,  to  borrow  a
phrase  from  David  Luban  and Michael  Millemann,  that  there  is  a
"natural" law of lawyering8° that differentiates the normative commit-
ments of lawyers  from those of ordinary citizens, are implicitly claim-
ing that there is something about the context in which lawyers engage
with clients and other members  of society that separates this occupa-
tion from all others, or at least all other "non-professionals. '81 Propo-
nents  of  the  strong  form  of  this  proposition,  i.e.,  that  legal  ethics
cannot be criticized "by reference to the universal moral code,"  have
been widely and persuasively criticized  for both ignoring the fact that
professions  such  as  law must be designed  to  fill  society's  needs  and
denying the importance of individual moral agency.83  Although  it has
Morgan & Tuttle, supra note 77, at 998-99 n.77 (expressing concern that context spe-
cific rules will not be able  to "stand  against harmful elements of that practice"). See
generally Milton Friedman,  Capitalism and Freedom 119-36 (1982)  (arguing  that spe-
cialization  creates  the potential  for monopolies).  For a sympathetic  account  of how
attention to context can and should lead to a totally decentralized  approach  to legal
ethics, see Gilson & Mnookin, supra  note  69, at 517 (endorsing  private contracts  be-
tween  lawyers  and clients  defining  the  scope  of the lawyer's  ethical  responsibility);
Simon,  Should Lawyers Obey  the Law?, supra note  72  (endorsing  a "substantivist"
approach to legal ethics in which individual practitioners  decide both the content and
the applicability of legal rules  according  to their own  conception  of legal merit);  Si-
mon, Ethical Discretion,  supra note 72 (advocating individual discretion  in ethical de-
cision making).  As I indicated above, Professor Painter makes a similar proposal with
respect to contracts  between agency lawyers and those representing regulated clients.
See Painter, Game Theoretic, supra note  33, at 178-80.
80.  See David Luban & Michael  Millemann, Good Judgment: Ethics Teaching in
Dark Times, 9 Geo. J. Legal Ethics  31,  41-42 (1995).
81.  See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., My Station as a Lawyer, 6 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 1, 7-9
(1989)  (arguing  that a lawyer's ethical obligations  are  defined by the unique require-
ments of his  "station").  See generally Paul Camenish, Grounding  Professional Ethics
in a Pluralistic  Society (1983)  (arguing that common normative commitments  link all
"professionals").
82.  Hazard, supra note  81,  at 16.
83.  See, e.g.,  David Luban, Lawyers and Justice:  An Ethical Study  126-27  (1988)
(critiquing  "my  station  and  its  duties"  from  the  perspective  of  moral  agency);
Deborah L. Rhode, Why the ABA  Bothers: A Functional  Perspective  on Professional
Codes, 59 Tex. L. Rev. 689,  690  (1981)  (noting that "professional codes  are desirable
only insofar as they serve common goals to a greater extent than other forms  of con-
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now become popular to treat problems  of professional ethics as if they
were simply particular instances  of more general moral or contractual
issues,'  I am, for reasons that I set out more fully elsewhere, sympa-
thetic to a weaker version of the professionalism thesis:  that there are
good grounds  for believing  that lawyers,  in virtue  of their role  with
respect to clients and society as a whole, do have prima facie norma-
tive  obligations  that  may  differ  from  other  members  of  society.s
Even these "professional"  obligations,  however, are best understood
in context.
Those who support unique professional obligations for lawyers must
ground these duties in some central feature of the lawyer's role, such
as the fact that lawyers  are  fiduciaries  or that lawyers have  been en-
trusted  with social  powers  that are not  granted  to ordinary  citizens.
Every one  of these  duties  and entitlements,  however,  is  defined  by
and refracted  through institutions.
Consider, for example, the claim that all lawyers have a prima facie
duty to obey the law.s6  This claim flows naturally from the traditional
model's assertion that one of the defining features of legal profession-
alism is that lawyers  have specialized  knowledge about law not avail-
able  to  ordinary  citizens.  As  Edward  Rubin  notes,  however,
although "[o]ne  can generalize  rather grandly about law,"  it is much
more  useful to conceive  of law as  "aspects  of social  institutions  that
operate  at  the  particularized  level."  Consequently,  the  "law"  to
which lawyers owe their obligation is in reality a vast overlapping web
trol").  I have argued in  favor of both of these objections  to the strong  form of "my
station and its duties."  See David B.  Wilkins,  Practical  Wisdom for Practicing Law-
yers: Separating  Ideals from Ideology in Legal Ethics, 108 Harv.  L. Rev. 458 (1994)
(arguing that legal ethics must always be accountable to society's purposes, and there-
fore,  society's  ethics); Wilkins,  Legal Realism, supra note  34,  at  514  (arguing  that
"[f]or  individual lawyers, ethical decisionmaking  is inevitably a good faith exercise  in
discretionary  judgment"  which  lawyers  cannot  completely  evade  by  appealing  to
either rules or roles).  I return to  the distinction  between individual  decisionmaking
and designing social  institutions below.
84.  See, eg., Macey & Miller, supra note  65, at 1105  (arguing  that "any  problem
between lawyers and clients in the private  sector is simply a particular manifestation
of the general agency problem that exists between shareholders and corporate manag-
ers, or doctors and patients").
85.  See David B. Wilkins, In Defense of Law and Morality: Why Lawyers Have a
Prima  Facie Obligation  to Obey the Law, 38 Win. & Mary L Rev. (forthcoming 1996).
For a general defense of the normative coherence  of "professionalism"  when under-
stood in institutional  terms, see David  B.  W"lkins,  Redefining the "Professional" in
Professional  Ethics:  An  Interdisciplinary  Approach to  Teaching Professionalism,  58
Law & Contemp. Probs. 241  (1995).
86.  See Morgan & Tuttle, supra  note 77, at 1004-05;  W"lkins, Obey the Law, supra
note 85,  at 28.
87.  See Stephen  L. Pepper,  The  Lawyer's Amoral Ethical Role:  A  Defense, A
Problem, and Some Possibilities,  1986  Am.  B.  Found.  Res. J.  613,  617  (arguing that
lawyers have  unique access to the public good of law).
88.  Edward L. Rubin, The New Legal Process,  the Synthesis of Discourse, and the
Microanalysis  of Institutions, 109 Harv. L. Rev.  1393,  1425  (1996).
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of public and private institutions that define, negotiate, interpret, and
apply legal rules and principles.  The substantive content of the "law"
that emerges from this process, and, therefore, the normative content
of the lawyer's  ethical obligation, cannot be separated from  this con-
text-specific institutional process. 8 9
Moreover,  what it means for a lawyer to "obey"  the law  is itself a
function of institutional context.  Lawyers  occupy a number of distinct
roles  within the  political and social institutions  that make  and inter-
pret law.  These roles plausibly  affect  the  stance that a  given  lawyer
should  take  towards  a  particular  legal  rule.  Thus,  to take  a  simple
example, an advocate in court arguably shows no disrespect for a stat-
ute when  she  argues  in a  brief that  the rule  should  be  disregarded
because it would cost her client too much to comply.  If the same law-
yer counseled a client in her office to ignore the rule on these grounds,
we might have grounds for claiming that she violated  her prima facie
commitment to legality.  Once we recognize the many differences  that
lie concealed  within  the  broad categories  of "advocates"  and  "advi-
sors,"  we  will  be  forced  to  acknowledge  that there  are  many  other
instances in which the particular circumstances surrounding a lawyer's
relationship  to a given law-making or law-interpreting institution  will,
for better or for worse, plausibly  affect the substantive  content of the
general  command  to "obey the law." 90
Finally, contrary to the traditional model's image of the solo practi-
tioner and the  individual  client, most lawyers  work in  organizations
and for organizations.91 These private institutions also play an impor-
tant role in constructing the practical content that lawyers give to legal
rules.  In  his  pioneering  study  of the  New York  bar, Jerome  Carlin
demonstrated  that  a  given  lawyer's  understanding  of  the normative
content of ethical rules will be strongly influenced  by the "ethical  cli-
mate"  of  the  institutions in  which the  lawyer works.9  More  recent
examinations of the practices  of various subgroups within the profes-
sion underscore the extent to which the institutions in which lawyers
89.  As Professor Rubin argues, the political decision  to "protect the environment"
is  given  legal  expression  through  "the  specific  rules by which  this protection  is  ef-
fected,  the organization  of the  agency  to which the task is  assigned,  the procedures
that  the  agency  must  follow,  and  the  grounds  on  which  its  decisions  can  be  chal-
lenged." Id. As a result, the study of environmental law "can be described as a micro-
analysis  of these institutions." Id.
90.  See Wilkins, Making Context Count, supra note 29,  at 1183-203  (arguing that
"litigation counsel" may have different ethical obligations vis-a-vis "the law" than reg-
ulatory counsel).
91.  See  Richard L. Abel, American Lawyers  203  (1989)  (noting  that by the mid-
1970s, corporate clients consumed more than one-half of all private legal services  and
that of the remaining half, less than  18 percent  were devoted to serving the personal
interests  of individuals);  Ted  Schneyer, Professional Discipline for Law Firms?, 77
Cornell L. Rev. 1, 4 (1991)  (noting  that more than two-thirds of the legal profession
now practices  in some kind of institutional setting);
92.  See Jerome E.  Carlin, Lawyers'  Ethics:  A Survey of the  New York  City Bar
166-67 (1966).
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live and work structure their understanding  of and allegiance  to legal
norms.93
Collectively,  these realities  underscore  the legal  profession's  deep
connection and commitment to the institutions in which law is created,
interpreted, and applied.  To the extent that we are to develop an ac-
count of lawyer professionalism that has meaning in the real world, it
must begin with a detailed  study of how these institutions  shape and
are  shaped  by  the  actions  of  lawyers.  Context,  therefore,  is
unavoidable.
By focusing on institutions, however, a contextual approach to pro-
fessional  regulation  can  also  minimize  some  of  the  administrative
problems  captured  by  the  second  prong  of the  specificity  problem.
Five aspects of this second prong are especially relevant  to the issues
addressed in this Symposium:  duplication, conflicts, competition, cap-
ture, and fragmentation.  I close this part by discussing how the contri-
butions to this Symposium illuminate  each of these  issues.
A.  Duplication
In Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, I characterized  the domains in-
habited by corporate  and individual  lawyers as "semi-autonomous so-
cial  fields"  to  illustrate  how  these  hemispheres  of  the  bar  both
"generate  rules  and  customs  and  systems  internally,"  but  are  also
"vulnerable  to rules  and decisions  and  other forces  emanating  from
the larger world." ' 9  The same can be said about each of the sanction-
ing systems.  The five principal articles  in this Symposium consistently
demonstrate how decisions that are made in one arena are influenced,
either  consciously  or  unconsciously,  by  actions  that  are  taken  in
another.
This permeability raises several potential problems for a contextual
approach  to  professional  regulation.  First,  as  Professor  Green  has
noted in another article, "too many regulators  [can] produce too  little
enforcement."'95  Underenforcement  can occur,  as Green  argues with
93.  See, eg., Michael J. Kelly, Lives of Lawyers:  Journeys in the Organizations of
Practice 8-12 (1994)  (arguing that different  work places develop their own conception
of "legal professionalism"  and other core  values); Robert  L  Nelson  and David M.
Trubek, Arenas of Professionalism  The Professional  Ideologies of Lawyers in Con-
text, in Lawyers'  IdealsfLawyers'  Practices  177, 179 (1992)  (arguing that "conceptions
of lawyer professionalism  reflect 'the  arenas'  in which  they are produced").  For an
insightful account of the various ways that institutions structure legal compliance, see
Elizabeth Chambliss, Towards the Displacement  of EEO Conflict (1996)  (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the Fordham Law Review); Lauren B. Edelman et al., Internal
Dispute Resolution: The Transformation of Civil Rights in the Workplace, 27 Law &
Soc'y Rev. 497 (1993).
94.  Wilkins,  Who  Should Regulate Lawyers?, supra note 1, at 818 n.82  (quoting
Sally  F. Moore, Law and Social Change: The Semi-Autonomous Social Field as an
Appropriate Subject of Study, 7  Law & Soe'y Rev. 719, 720 (1973)).
95.  Bruce A. Green, Policing  Federal  Prosecutors: Do Too Many Regulators Pro-
duce Too Little Enforcement?, 8 St. Thomas L. Rev. 69 (1995).
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respect  to prosecutors,  because  "the  various  disciplinary  authorities
can justify relying on others to carry the load."96  Or, to cite Professor
Zacharias's  description  of the  no-contact  debate,  underenforcement
also occurs when one set of regulators steadfastly refuses to acknowl-
edge  the legitimate  interests of other interested institutions. 7
Multiple and permeable regulation  can, of course, produce  the op-
posite effect-overenforcement.  Mr. Davis's description  of insurance
regulation  is  instructive.  Disciplinary  and  liability  controls  already
seek to prevent lawyers from representing conflicting interests.  Davis
now suggests that insurance carriers may refuse to indemnify lawyers
in  all  cases  involving conflicts.  Although  Davis  views  this as an  un-
qualified victory for legal ethics, this characterization, as Professor Sil-
ver  notes,  is  overly  optimistic. 98  It  is  not  difficult  to  imagine
circumstances  in which multiple representation  is in the best interest
of the legal system.  Although cases involving the joint representation
of an employer and its employees, joint defendants, or joint plaintiffs
certainly present ethical problems, it is also true that in the absence of
joint representation, some clients will be unable to afford legal repre-
sentation.  If lawyers face the loss of insurance coverage,  as well as the
threat of bar discipline and disqualification,  it is likely that many prac-
titioners  will  view  the risks  of  such representation  as  exceeding  the
benefits, leaving those clients who can not afford separate counsel  to
fend for themselves.99
B.  Conflicts
A related problem stemming from the existence of multiple regula-
tors is the danger that different sanctioning  systems will develop con-
flicting  substantive  standards  of lawyer  conduct.  Such conflicts  pose
two problems.  First, lawyers  who  are arguably subject  to more  than
one sanctioning  system  will  have  a  difficult  time  determining  which
rule  they should follow in particular  cases.  Second,  conflicting  rules
give  lawyers  the opportunity to structure  their conduct  so as  to take
advantage of the most beneficial rule system.  The articles in this Sym-
posium demonstrate  the importance  of both of these concerns.
Professor  Little  underscores  the  problems  federal prosecutors  en-
countered when they were confronted  with conflicting interpretations
of the no-contact rules in various district courts.1 00  Little's discussion
highlights  the  danger inherent  in a  system of professional  regulation
96.  Id  at 91.
97.  See Zacharias, Response to Little, supra note 3,  at 457-58  (discussing how the
ABA and DOJ emphasized the personal interests of its dispute over the constituents
in  the regulation  of grand jury subpoenas  directed to attorneys).
98.  See Silver, Response to Davis, supra note  36,  at 241-42.
99.  This  is  another example of the danger of overlooking  distinctions  among  cli-
ents when judging the effects of any form of professional regulation, particularly mar-
ket controls.
100.  See Little, Federal Prosecutors,  supra note 9,  at  369-75.
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that  uses  geography  as  a  contextual  variable.  There  is,  of  course,
nothing  new about this problem.  Given  that professional  regulation
has  traditionally  been  considered  the  province  of  state  supreme
courts, there has  always been  the potential  for lawyers  practicing  in
different states to encounter  conflicting standards.  Nevertheless,  the
nationalization  of many sectors of legal practice, when combined with
the  ABA's waning  ability to  set uniform  standards  of conduct,  has
brought the problem into sharp relief. 1 01
Professor Zacharias  accurately  summarizes  and critiques  the argu-
ments  in favor  of  using geography  as  a  contextual  factor  in  profes-
sional  regulation.'02  Whether  or  not  this calculus  favors  creating  a
federal code  of ethics for all lawyers, Little's analysis  makes a strong
case for national regulation of the conduct  of federal  prosecutors.
Ted Schneyer's  claim  that many  lawyers  who  represent  corporate
clients  have, in  the wake  of Kaye,  Scholer  and  other  developments,
reorganized as limited liability entities underscores the second danger
posed by the existence of conflicting rule structures.'0 3  Limited liabil-
ity has primarily been a legislative creation.  Although  many  bar as-
sociations have tacitly embraced this concept, it nevertheless  remains
in tension with the Model Rule's presumption that partners are vicari-
ously liable  for each  other's  misconduct1"  Given  this kind  of  rule
conflict,  sophisticated  actors  can  shape  their  conduct  to  their
advantage.
C.  Competition
Regulators  sometimes do more than  simply enact conflicting  stan-
dards.  In some instances, they actively  compete for regulatory  domi-
nance.  This competition  is not always  harmful.  Professor Silver, for
example, notes that competition within the liability insurance industry
is likely to blunt some of the more wide-ranging  regulatory effects of
this  form  of  control  predicted  by  Davis. 05  Similarly,  Professor
Painter hypothesizes that allowing individual contracting between reg-
ulatory lawyers  and those who represent regulated  entities can create
a market for lawyers with  a reputation for cooperation. 6
Nevertheless, there are also dangers inherent in regulatory competi-
tion.  Professor  Zacharias  captures  these  dangers  in  his  detailed de-
scription  of the  war between  the ABA  and  the Justice  Department
101.  See Zacharias,  Federalizing  Legal Ethics, supra note 27.
102.  See id  at 373-79.
103.  See Schneyer, Foreword,  supra note 2, at 55,  57-58.
104.  See  John  Leubsdorf,  Legal  Malpractice and Professional Responsibility, 48
Rutgers  L. Rev.  101,  142  (1995)  (arguing  that because  of the  move  towards  limited
liability, "little...  remain[s] of vicarious  liability in  practice").
105.  See Silver, Response to Davis, supra note  36, at 243-44.
106.  See Painter,  Game Theoretic, supra note 33, at 189-90.
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over the no-contact rules. °7  As he demonstrates, neither of these two
regulators has adequately taken account  of the legitimate interests  of
the other.  Instead, the two sides have simply sought to maximize their
own  interests.  This  danger  is  particularly  acute  in  circumstances
where the regulator has been captured by those whom it was designed
to regulate.
D.  Capture
The phenomenon  of agency capture is well documented in adminis-
trative law literature.1 08  Two of the contributions  to this Symposium
apply  this concept to the field  of professional  regulation.
Professor Brickman highlights the familiar dark side of agency cap-
ture.  In  his  view, the ABA's  Committee on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility  has been captured  by an alliance  of plaintiffs'  and  de-
fendants'  lawyers  intent  on maximizing  their  own  fees.'0 9  Whether
one agrees  with Brickman's assessment, his analysis  underscores  the
degree to which  disciplinary controls and other self-regulatory  devices
are particularly susceptible to capture.
Professor Painter, on the  other hand,  reminds  us that  agency  cap-
ture  is  not always  inefficient." l 0  In circumstance  where  mistrust  and
lack  of communication  lock  agencies  and  firms  in  a  cycle  of mutual
defection,  agency  capture  may actually  produce  more  compliance  at
less  cost than  a regime characterized  by regulatory independence.
Whether  capture is likely to result in the harmful effects predicted
by Professor Brickman  or the beneficial  ones  described by Professor
Painter is a function of the particular interactions  between regulators
and lawyers.  Indeed, Professor Painter goes so far as to argue that in
order  to maximize  the  chances  of  achieving  "efficient"  capture,  we
should  move  to  a  regime  of individual  contracting.  Such  a  regime,
however, would bring the issue of fragmentation into sharp relief.
E.  Fragmentation
Professor  Painter's  celebration  of  individually  negotiated  ethical
rules recalls William  Simon's powerful  arguments in favor of individ-
ual discretion  in lawyering and Ted Schneyer's  criticism that categori-
cal rules do not provide answers to all aspects of all cases within those
categories.  Nevertheless, there are dangers in moving towards an  ex-
clusively individualist approach.
107.  See Zacharias, Response to Little, supra note 3,  at 460-61.
108.  See, e.g., John Shepard Wiley, Jr., A Capture Theory of Antitrust Federalism,  99
Harv. L. Rev. 713,  741 (1986)  (proposing the use of "capture theory to design a more
selective  rule of [federal]  preemption"  in antitrust policy).
109.  See Brickman,  Contingency Fees, supra note  19, at 257-59.
110.  See Painter, Game Theoretic, supra  note 33, at 163-64.  Painter's analysis builds
on the pioneering work of Ayres and Braithwaite. See Ian Ayres & John Braithwaite,
Responsive  Regulation:  Transcending  the Deregulation  Debate (1992).
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Individualist systems, whether  based on contract or conscience,  are
subject to a number  of limitations.  Such schemes  are more  likely to
undermine  a  particular  lawyer's  commitment  to  collective  projects
that, although of minimal benefit  to any individual  lawyer, are  in the
best interest of the profession.  In addition, a workable system of pro-
fessional regulation must account for such traditional  rule of law  val-
ues as  constancy, fairness, and predictability.  All of these goods are
harder to guarantee in a regime of case-by-case decision making.  Nor,
as I indicated above, is such a system likely to produce  much publicly
available information about lawyer conduct.  Finally, a truly individu-
alist regime would  have  to account  for  an almost  infinite  number of
variations of lawyers, clients, and regulatory settings.
These challenges must be balanced against the benefits, outlined by
Professor Painter and others, of reaching increasingly  refined contex-
tual judgments about the effectiveness  or desirability of various forms
of professional  regulation.  Future  analysis  in this  field  must seek  to
understand  how this balance  should be struck.
III.  THE  FUTURE  OF COMPARATIVE  INSTITUTIONAL  ANALYSIS
Professor Schneyer concludes  his Foreword  with a  call for a richer
body of scholarship addressing institutional choices in the field of pro-
fessional regulation."'  I wholeheartedly join this  call.  Institutions lie
between the generality  of formal rules  and the particularism  of indi-
vidual decision making.  As a result, in fields  ranging from economics
to political  theory, scholars have  increasingly  focused on  institutions
as  the arena  in  which the  abstract  commands  of  legal rules  and the
disparate  goals  of  individuals  intersect  and  are  given  meaning  and
expression."1
2
With  respect  to  lawyers,  institutions  both  collect  and  mediate
among the objectives  of different groups of practitioners.  Sometimes
this institutional  effect  highlights  the  extent  to which  in certain  set-
tings, contextual  distinctions  that might be seen  as fragmenting  legal
ethics are in reality overlapping and mutually reinforcing.  For exam-
ple, lawyers who represent regulated clients before federal administra-
tive agencies  tend to work  in  similar  kinds  of law  firms  and  devote
most of their professional energy to a few well-defined  and highly spe-
cialized  tasks.113  Focusing  on the unique problems these lawyers face
is, therefore, more likely to generate  real consensus  about the ethical
rules that should apply in this context than to conduct an  abstract in-
111.  Schneyer, Foreword,  supra note 2, at 35.
112.  See Rubin, supra note 88,  at 1411-24.
113.  See  John  N.  Heinz & Edward  0.  Laumann,  Chicago  Lawyers:  The Social
Structure  of the Bar 324  (1982).  I  make  this point  with respect  to banking  lawyers
and tax lawyers, in Wflkins, Making Context Count, supra note 29, at 1212,  and Wil-
kins, Legal Realism, supra note 34,  at 519-20,  respectively.
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vestigation  into  the  norms  that  should  apply  to  all  lawyers  in  all
contexts.
On  other  occasions,  focusing  on  the  institutions in  which lawyers
work provides a framework for determining which contextual factors
are relevant in any given analysis.  Thus, to borrow another example
from  the  Symposium,  focusing  on  whether  and  on  what  grounds
courts, as opposed to disciplinary  agencies,  should disqualify lawyers
from representing conflicting interests provides both a framework  and
a  set of criteria for evaluating the feasibility  and  desirability  of regu-
lating conflicts that are not present  when we move  to the more gen-
eral  question  of defining the  obligations  that lawyers  owe  to present
and former clients.  Once  again, placing  institutions  at the  center  of
the analysis allows us to make sense of the actions of diverse individu-
als and provides a set of criteria for evaluating their conduct.
Finally,  institutions  determine  the  extent  to  which  individualized
ethics based on either conscience or contract are feasible and/or desir-
able.  Certain institutional structures are more conducive to individual
initiative  and  decision  making.  Others  impose  high  costs  (individu-
ally, systemically, or both) on such projects.  To borrow from the Sym-
posium for  a final time, the structure  of corporate firms representing
regulated  clients  and  the  dynamics  of the  plaintiff's  personal  injury
market may make it substantially more difficult to develop the kind of
individualized  responses to regulating lawyers in these two areas pro-
posed  by Professors Painter and Brickman.
The study of the legal profession, therefore, must center around the
"microanalysis  of...  institutions.""' 4  Who Should Regulate Lawyers?
was an attempt to set out the general parameters for this kind of anal-
ysis.  The contributions to this Symposium, however, demonstrate the
need to apply these tools to specific problems and institutions.  I look
forward  to participating in the further  development  of this work.
114.  Rubin, supra note 88, at 1425.
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